【管理科学与工程学院学术论坛】Dr. Chi Zhang ：Critical Infrastructure Protection against Intentional Attacks
发布日期：2012-06-14主题：Critical Infrastructure Protection against Intentional Attacks
时间 ： 2012 年6月15日（周五）下午，2:00-3:30
地点 ：球探篮球比分,竞彩足球比分管理科学与工程学院会议室
主讲人: Dr. Chi Zhang, Department of Systems Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology
主讲人简介: Chi Zhang received his PhD in Systems Engineering at School of Systems and Enterprises (SSE), Stevens Institute of Technology in 2012. His research focus is on understanding infrastructure performance degradation and upkeep when considering external threats. His research spans reliability and vulnerability analysis for optimization. He is the recipient of the outstanding dissertation award and the best student paper award of SSE, Stevens Institute of Technology, 2012. He received a B.S. degree in Industrial Engineering and a M.S. degree in Management Science & Engineering from Xi’an Jiaotong University in 2004 and 2007 respectively.
ABSTRACT：One of the main threats to networked critical infrastructures is from intentional attackers, who are resourceful and inventive. For developing affordable protection strategies for these infrastructures, this talk introduces game theoretic approaches to study the interaction between protector and rational attackers. This talk firstly focuses on the detection of an infrastructure’s vulnerabilities, understood in this research as the critical components that the attacker targets to maximize the damage to an infrastructure. To do so, two optimization frameworks for critical components detection are presented under two different conditions of information availability: complete and incomplete information. Secondly, based on vulnerabilities detection, the protector’s two information disclosing policies, namely disclosure and secrecy, are studied respectively in two types of games: two-stage game and simultaneous game. Compared with traditional research, the proposed approaches are more realistic since they can be applied to the protection of critical infrastructures with both large scale and general topologies. Moreover, incomplete information and mixed strategies are respectively considered in the two-stage game and the simultaneous game.
[编辑]：孙颖
