【商学院学术讲座】朱万山：The newsvendor’s optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
发布日期：2012-11-23主题：The newsvendor’s optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
主讲人：朱万山，清华大学工业工程系副教授，密西根大学工业与运筹工程博士，主要从事运筹管理科学的研究与教学。其科研集中在解决跨国多级供应链系统中的最优库存，信息共享，风险控制等问题，成果已发表在MS&OM 和 IIE Transactions 等学术期刊，其中一篇论文在2010年被IIE Transactions 主编推荐为工业工程师杂志上的亮点成果，另有多篇论文在 Operations Research 和 Management Science 等期刊的审稿中。朱教授有多年的实践工作经验，曾任职于ABB和Wells Fargo等跨国公司，以及中国电力科学研究院，目前正为美国Caterpillar公司研发服务部件的需求预测和库存管理。
Abstract:
We consider a newsvendor who earns revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about their willingness to pay. We focus on the impact of the number of advertisers on the newsvendor’s optimal decisions. We find that regardless of the number of advertisers, the newsvendor may exclude advertisers with a low willingness to pay and distort the price and inventory from their system-efficient levels to screen the advertisers. Moreover, the newsvendor’s decision to exclude an advertiser is based exclusively on that advertiser’s characteristics, and the newsvendor’s optimal decision thus reveals independence among the advertisers. Nonetheless, the profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers also display network effects as both increase in the number of advertisers. Finally, our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.
时间：2012年11月28日（周三）下午2：30-3：30
地点：商学院会议室
主办单位：商学院
[编辑]：孙颖
