【3月23日】【会计学院学术论坛】Economic Consequences of Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC Regulation on Related-Party Transactions
发布日期：2018-03-20讲座人：Haihao Lu
讲座主题：Economic Consequences of Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC Regulation on Related-Party Transactions
摘要：This paper examines the economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation mandating public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, I find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, suggesting an improvement in RPT governance. This reduction is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage, weaker product-market competition, and lower institutional ownership. I also find that the disclosure effect is conditional on the types of RPTs and on the identities of the parties involved. Specifically, the disclosure effect concentrates on RPTs with the CEO, with the chairman of the board, and with directors, and on RPTs involving sales, leases, or loans, suggesting these transactions are more likely used for expropriation. Finally, I find that the disclosure of RPT governance reduces the implied costs of capital (ICC) associated with RPTs. I examine two possible mechanisms reducing the costs of capital and find that the governance channel is the main contributing factor over the information channel. My inferences are robust to the use of either the volume or amount of RPTs. Taken together, this study provides evidence about how disclosure on governance can enhance firms’ governance and about the real effects of the 2006 SEC’s regulation.
讲座时间：2018年03月23日，周五，10:30开始
讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂604
讲座人简介：Haihao Lu，加拿大滑铁卢大学助理教授，曾于2017年在University of Toronto取得博士学位。他的主要研究兴趣包括关联交易、管理者特质等，相关成果发表于Journal of Business Finance and Accounting等国际知名财务与会计学期刊。
[编辑]：张萌
