【4月16日】【经济学院政治经济学与产业经济学讲座系列】2019年春季学期第一讲·Effectiveness and Efficacy of R&D Subsidies: Estimating Treatment Effects with One-sided Noncompliance
发布日期：2019-04-12讲座主题：Effectiveness and Efficacy of R&D Subsidies: Estimating Treatment Effects with One-sided Noncompliance
主讲嘉宾：Philipp Boeing（ZEW研究员及北京大学中国经济研究中心客座助理教授）
讲座时间：2019年4月16日（周二），下午2：00-3：30
讲座地点：沙河校区主教508
嘉宾简介：Philipp Boeing博士是德国ZEW欧洲经济研究中心“创新与产业动态经济学”研究部研究员。 此外，他还是北京大学国家发展研究院中国经济研究中心的客座助理教授。 他的主要研究兴趣是公司层面的创新经济学，包括政策评估，研究活动的生产力效应和专利质量。 他目前的研究特别关注中国在创新驱动型经济中的发展及其对欧洲的影响。
内容摘要：In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature so far has completely neglected the possibility of misappropriation of public funds. This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the causal effect of R&D subsidies on R&D expenditures when monitoring is weak and misappropriation takes place due to moral hazard behavior. Our analysis is based on Chinese firm-level data for the period 2001-2011. Misappropriation is a major concern as we calculate that 42% of grantees misused R&D subsidies, corresponding to 53% of the total amount of R&D subsidies. In a setting with one-sided noncompliance to funding contract rules, we differentiate between the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect and the complier average causal effect (CACE). The ITT shows how effective the R&D policy was in practice when misappropriation exists. The CACE, in contrast, depicts how effective the policy could have been without misappropriation and thus is a measure for the efficacy of the R&D subsidy policy. Combining entropy balancing and IV methods to estimate both ITT and CACE, the ITT results show mild partial crowding out of R&D expenditures. Most strikingly, however, the CACE turns out to be more than twice as large as the ITT and confirms additionality of R&D subsidies. Thus, misappropriation of R&D subsidies considerably undermines the efficacy of Chinese R&D programs.
[编辑]：张萌
